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25X1 MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

25X1 SUBJECT: Comments on Draft Paper Intelligence  
Communications and Related Procedures,  
17 March 1958



1. Attached are comments by elements of the DD/P on subject paper. The comments have been grouped under the following general headings:

General Comments  
Control of Information  
Other Sources of Delay  
Security  
Cost  
Personnel  
~~Requirements~~  
Miscellaneous Problems

2. No attempt has been made to reach a consolidated DD/P position. We have simply quoted verbatim the comments and opinions of various individuals within the DD/P area divisions and staff. We have included the unfavorable comments along with the favorable, and quoted remarks to which the DD/P would not officially subscribe, in the belief that all the thoughts which your paper generated would be helpful to you in working out the details of your proposal.

25X1 3. Should you have any questions about individual comments or desire to discuss the paper further with the DD/P, please contact



Thomas H. Karamessines

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## GENERAL COMMENTS

25X1 (1) "It has been said that the present intricate and tedious convolutions of government administration stem from the fact that the vast technical complications of the 20th century are being dealt with by the bureaucratic mechanisms of the 19th. We can only applaud any step, however small, which is made in a direction leading toward the heart of this problem. [ ] plan does this; however, it still achieves only a speed-up of transmission time and does not address itself to the further problem of reducing the number of people or the number of copies involved in any given situation."

(2) "Unquestionably, a speed-up is essential in the transmittal of information from field collector to analyst. [ ] paper is a valuable proposal towards the accomplishment of that end."

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(3) "The purpose of the procedure in expediting communications in general is considered to possess merit."

(4) "We agree that a communications system such as that described in the subject paper would be an invaluable asset to the intelligence community as a whole and particularly to this Agency."

25X1 (5) "The problem of how to achieve the most rapid possible passage of information from collector to analyst is highly important to the security of the U.S. While our present system is not perfect, it has at least been adequate in the emergencies we have so far encountered. Nevertheless we must be constantly alert to its improvement, and in this [ ] paper has merit as far as it goes. But speed alone is not the answer, and the problem for the Clandestine Services is far more serious than the mere sacrifice of "current standards of form and appearance" that [ ] cites."

(6) "Given adequate security of transmission and personnel and sources, and given adequate CIA control or coordination, this Division considers that it would be of the greatest value if the transmission of dispatch intelligence by all intelligence agencies in the field could be speeded up to approximate the present and future speed of CIA cable traffic. The accelerating speed of world developments and hostile weapons systems requires this corresponding acceleration of the intelligence process if it is feasible. The factors referred to at paragraph 4 of reference

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(change of relationships and work, expense) do not invalidate these conclusions."

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25X1 (7) "The basis premise of the paper - that intelligence communications of all types must reach customer analysts more quickly to be valuable - is prima facie correct. With modifications, I believe we could eventually adapt to [ ] procedure. However, we question whether the analysts can consume all the intelligence every 24 hours. Speed alone will not improve the quality of our national intelligence. If the analyst gets everything every 24 hours, will it improve national estimates? While the community is arguing the estimate will become dated. We rather resent [ ] implication in paragraph 9 that the collector is to blame for our dilemma. The consumer shares the blame and at the highest level. Some acknowledgment of the consumers' share in this might have helped in his presentation of his idea to collectors."

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25X1 (8) "Almost without exception our people directed critical comment at [ ] concern with speed per se. It is difficult to agree that the present communications system is inadequate because it evolved from earlier systems, or, to follow the paper in equating the early warning problem with the receipt by all Washington analysts of information from everywhere on a current basis. [ ] essay falls short of showing what would be a vital fact in his chain of reasoning, namely, that the present system because of its delays and inconstancies has failed to put available information before those who should have it, in time to make appropriate decisions. There was some feeling among those who read [ ] paper that perhaps his statement of the problem and his assumptions "covered" a recondite feeling that the representatives of the U.S. intelligence community abroad are incapable of recognizing important and urgent information and that only Washington analysts can do this. In general [ ] description of the equipment stimulates the imagination and interest. It will, probably, however, be difficult to remake the U.S. intelligence community around the equipment."

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(9) "The idea that all intelligence be transmitted by the super-speed communication means is unrealistic. Certainly over half of the intelligence we get is just as valuable after two or three weeks or months as it is within 24 hours. The proposed system would encourage operations officers to do what we want eventually to train (or force) them not to do: namely, to forward information indiscriminately. Let us have no doubts about it, indiscriminate intelligence reporting encourages indiscriminate intelligence collecting. Probably we shall never reach the point where all

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case officers will exercise expert judgment in selecting targets, but that is no reason to institutionalize their inexpertness by telling them to report everything at once by the fastest means possible."

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## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

T. H. Karamessines

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

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DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.

2. Room 354 Admin Bldg.

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These are personal expressions of views, not reflecting ODI/P positions in any sense; they're for your personal use in further consideration of your ideas.



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## CONTROL OF INFORMATION

(1) "Under the proposed system, Washington distribution would consist of addresses named by the field station, plus addresses determined by a message center acting as a service of common concern to the Intelligence Community. We can agree to this system only if DD/P personnel sit in the message center and make the final determination on distribution of DD/P reports."

(2) "The fact is that the automatic and indiscriminate promulgation of raw intelligence to the intelligence community could be even more dangerous than the shortcomings of the present system. There have been extensive exchanges between several of the operating divisions and OCI representatives which should do much to set standards which should facilitate more rapid yet properly evaluated intelligence dissemination. Here is really the crux of the problem."

(3) "A careful distinction must be drawn between the process of speeding transmission and methods of processing the intelligence. The latter should remain generally within the present security and collation and organizational concepts. Specifically, the 'one integrated communications network' should, for security of transmission and personnel and sources, as well as for essential collation by CIA of CIA intelligence, be controlled by CIA under the authority given it by the National Security Act. It would seem consistent with this for each sending agency to have separate ciphers and slugs which would effect immediate distribution in Washington to the agency which had originated the information in the field. However, it is imperative, for control of the quality and the extent of the dissemination, as well as for the protection of sources, that CIA intelligence be not automatically disseminated."

(4) "The weakest link in the proposed procedure is in the determination of distribution - a matter which will need further and very careful study."

(5) "Consideration should be given in the development of the proposal to the thought whether easy and rapid communications might not result in the release of dubious, or even wrong, reports - the kind that are killed or modified under a more leisurely system. Further, field originators could not, in all or even a large part of cases, logically determine by themselves the correct or proper Washington distribution. As a general practice, it would be deleterious to permit the field to determine the distribution to the whole community."

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(6) "While it is true that intelligence is a perishable product and must be handled with utmost speed, it is also true that all products of covert collection must undergo certain processing before passage to a consumer. Therefore it is imperative that any communications system for intelligence must be adapted to the necessary peculiarities of intelligence collection and processing, rather than try to fit the intelligence collection effort to a high-speed system solely for the sake of speed. No intelligence organization engaged in covert collection can operate entirely for the sake of expediency, and an efficient organization will temper this expediency with security - security meaning not only the steps necessary to protect operations and sources, but also the steps necessary for the organization to bring its talents to bear on an information report so that the report may reach a consumer with some guarantee of its validity and accuracy."

(7) "It is believed impractical to require the originator of an intelligence report to prescribe its distribution when preparing his dispatch. It appears preferable to address the dispatch to the agency for which the originator operates and leave further distribution to expert intelligence personnel at the Washington message center. Rapid transmission and dissemination of intelligence are but two of the factors to be considered in improving the intelligence output of the community. The improvement of these two without individuals of superior discrimination and judgment to screen the input to the system would only result in a fantastic flood of materials of questionable value arriving in Washington and being disseminated to already overburdened senior officials."

(8) "We are less enthusiastic about those proposals for automatic transmission of all material to other services, for the following reasons: (1) the intelligence community <sup>would</sup> ~~would~~ be flooded with a huge number of reports, all in the same format. (Probably this would not be greater than the present volume, or not much greater, but there would be little indication of priority or importance; perhaps this could be taken care of by precedence indicators or the like); (2) individual headquarters would lose control, quality-wise, of field station dissemination."

(9) "If all information collected in the field were distributed directly to the ultimate consumers, the selectivity afforded by Headquarters review would be eliminated. In practical terms, this would mean that in addition to what consumers now receive from the DD/P, they would get reports Headquarters desks decide are not worthy of dissemination. The capability to spot and eliminate duplication, false confirmation, fabrication and possible deception material cannot be expected of field collectors. Thus, institution of

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the proposed system would mean a reduction in quality of all reports thus processed, and an increase in distribution of duplicated, fabricated and questionably reliable information in order to effect what would probably be a very slight increase in the speed with which this material reaches interested consumers."

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## OTHER SOURCES OF DELAY

(1) "Attention should be given to other sources of delay. For example, we know that in many cases a shortage of manpower for handling the material can be even more costly in time than delays in transmission. In such cases a comparatively small expenditure for more information-handlers might yield proportionately better results than setting up a rapid transmission plan with a slow in-feeder system."

(2) "The procedure has not taken into consideration delays at both ends of the communication line, resulting in part from the connecting of all intelligence communications into one system."

(3) "Our experience has been that distribution within customer agencies has lagged and contributed to delays almost as much as delays in distribution between agencies. The proposed changes would not remedy this. If a sufficient number of personnel were assigned to the reproduction and courier staffs under the present arrangement, the inter-agency time lag could be shortened."

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SECURITY

(1) "Subject paper is written as if the primary problem in speeding up communications is a mechanical one and assumes that in all instances material can be prepared in the field for direct distribution to Headquarters consumers, i.e., without any rewriting or review by the parent Headquarters. While these assumptions may be correct with regard to information acquired by other U.S. Government agencies, they do not apply so easily to clandestinely acquired information, especially that from sensitive sources. Certainly some DD/P information could be handled in the fashion outlined in the paper. In fact, we already have established a multiple addressee cable system, [redacted]

[redacted] which embodies many of the suggestions made by [redacted]

But, with regard to some DD/P acquired information, it is precisely that information which we feel the field is not in a position to handle securely that is most important to transmit rapidly to the ultimate interested consumers, i.e., our most sensitive operations are also our best. The DD/P is presently putting great emphasis on improving reports handling in the field so that more material can receive direct field distribution. But experience gained since the new system has been in effect indicates that a long process of education is going to be necessary before field stations can provide adequate protection to sensitive sources. Even assuming that the capabilities of field stations have reached their ultimate development, there will still be certain highly sensitive operations whose product cannot be handled securely in the field."

(2) "It is assumed that the model communications system described at paragraph 12 would be foolproof as to the security of the substantive intelligence. Any significant lack of such security could outweigh the benefits of speed. The problem of CIA source protection must be met by the proposed system at least as effectively as it is now. It is not clear what concentration of personnel, e.g., at code rooms or relay stations, and what accompanying cover problems, would result from the proposed system. It is vital that such concentration be kept within tolerable security limits."

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(3) "One comment raised a practical problem: What cover would there be for the flexo-writer in the field station?"

*None  
needed?*

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## COST

(1) "The study, however, contains no estimates of costs. This point might not be too important if the study dealt solely with the transmission of critical information, where costs should not be of primary concern. But the fact is that the proposal does not deal at all with the most critical information, which would continue to be transmitted by cable as at present. And in speeding up secondary information, two factors should be weighed: (1) cost against gain; (2) cost of any particular method against alternatives."

(2) "The equipment and equipment maintenance costs involved in the procedure may be prohibitive."

(3) "As pointed out in the paper, the installation of such a world-wide system will be expensive although no estimate of cost is included. However, if the decision is reached that the costs of installation are justified by the anticipated improvement in the intelligence process, the costs may not be prohibitive if prorated among the agencies served."

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PERSONNEL

25X1 (1) "Field Staffing. Although a certain amount of the selectivity exercised by Headquarters could be transferred to the Field by having reports officers with substantive background on the area stationed at every base or "relay center" which might be forwarding reports on the area, experience has shown that it is impossible for one person at such an outpost to keep current on what is happening in the area in all substantive fields. Nevertheless, a considerable increase in the number of trained reports officers stationed in the field would be required simply to decide what to translate ([redacted] percent of DD/P information on the area starts out at the field base in some language other than English) and to process the material to the point where it would be ready for the flexo-writer. The time required by these individuals to do this would not necessarily be less than that spent by a combination of field and Headquarters personnel under existing conditions.

Headquarters Staffing. Although the burden on Headquarters reports staffs would be reduced, thus allowing for a possible reduction in personnel, the reduction in the Division could be only slight. Adequate staff would have to be retained to keep abreast of developments in order to process reports from sensitive and technical operations, to screen CE, PP, and operational material for possible positive intelligence items, and to provide the kind of guidance on reporting to operational branches which is now afforded by a critical analysis of the field material and day-to-day familiarity with consumer interests."

(2) "We would need more reports officers in the field or reports-trained case officers who would have a good understanding of the consumers needs."

25X1 (3) "The proposed system would involve the transfer of many of our reports officers to our field stations and bases. In some cases, the [redacted] might prove insurmountable."

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## MISCELLANEOUS PROBLEMS AND COMMENTS

(1) "Much information is acquired in the form of bulky documents, often in foreign languages and often including charts, maps and photographs. Such materials must be transmitted by pouch, and their handling would gain nothing under the proposal. Even without the problems posed by bulk or by graphic materials, it is questionable whether the proposed system would be practical for the very large quantity of foreign language reports which are not translated in the field."

(2) "In addition to the percentage of material too sensitive to go direct from the field to the ultimate consumer, there is another category of information which for technical reasons can be processed only at Headquarters - that category acquired by technical mechanical means, e.g., photography and ELINT, which is forwarded undeveloped and requires processing and interpretation by highly specialized offices located only in the U.S. Operations using these devices presently produce highly valuable intelligence which is processed on a priority basis here at Headquarters."

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(4) "To what extent would the proposed system include operational and administrative (as opposed to intelligence) communications, bearing in mind that operational communications often contain disseminable intelligence?"

(5) "Re paragraph 12c, Consideration must be given to the proper time and place for the preparation of tape. If it is intended that the final copy and tape be made in the originator's office, there is no provision for change by a coordinator or releaser without unnecessary retyping for correct tape. If the message is released in draft, the preparation of tape should be in a pool of one or more flexowriter typists and not by typists assigned to the individual reporting units. The latter would require more extensive proof-reading of the copy made by the flexowriter before transmission of the tape than would be required if the tape were prepared by personnel especially trained for the job of perfect copy from corrected or amended draft."

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Re paragraph 13a,  handbooks would have to be kept up to date. Considering the number of agencies involved, there would be fairly frequent organizational and functional changes, and a procedure

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would have to be set up to ensure automatic and rapid notification of all such changes.

Re paragraph 13d, The message center would need a high calibre of secretariat personnel to perform its function of checking distribution. It would seem that at least one requirements officer from each department involved would have to be assigned to the message center, and a close liaison would have to be maintained with each department involved."

(6) "The objection was voiced by a number of readers to the proposal to organize "the communications of the intelligence community as a whole". The question was asked whether this could be done without damage to CIA as the national foreign clandestine agency. Should CIA become dependent on a central communications system run by another department or agency if the DCI is to fulfill his legal obligation to protect methods and sources? (it is recognized that the alternative, looking at things from  point of view, would be to have CIA control the system proposed)."



(7) "Little new equipment would have to be developed before the installation of such a system could be initiated but the principal difficulty foreseen, other than technical, would be in obtaining permission from the countries involved to operate the system within their territories. Other relatively minor difficulties to be overcome are in the selection of a sponsoring agency, prorating the installation costs and the operating personnel among the agencies served, in deciding the agency responsible for the operation of the Washington message center and finally, in formulating an agreement with the Department of Defense regarding custody of the system in theaters of operation in time of war."


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(8) "There is great room for improvement in handling intelligence and in taking advantage of new products and of technological advances. With the start of the "Flexowriter"  the DD/P will have taken the first step. Every indication points towards a step by step expansion of the system as soon as enough persons are trained to operate it, as the Office of Communications makes additional equipment available, and as DD/P reports procedures adapt the system to our needs. The problems that this system will create for the users of intelligence will largely determine the pace of our future action or what changes in our procedures will be necessary."

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(9) "We believe a trial should be conducted to test the feasibility of the proposed "continuum" and at the same time a study should be made to determine the costs, the real need, and the alternatives."

(10) "In the establishment of any new communications system for the intelligence product we also feel that consideration should be given to expediting intelligence operational communications. Experience has shown that emergency generated increases in military or other agency operational traffic delays not only the intelligence product but also communications vitally affecting the operations by which the intelligence is required."

Yes

(11) "Careful consideration would have to be given to the handling of Special Intelligence under the proposed system. Finished items would require special handling, and raw traffic could not be forwarded by the method proposed."

Why not?

(12) "We would have to insist on more precise requirements and priorities from the consumers who would also have to limit their need for certain marginal information."

Yes

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